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Abstract—We formulate a resource-planning game between
an attacker and a defender of a network control system. We
consider the network to be operating in closed-loop with a linear
quadratic regulator (LQR). We construct a general-sum, two-
player, mixed strategy game, where the attacker attempts to
destroy communication equipment of some nodes, and thereby
render the LQR feedback gain matrix to be sparse, leading to
degradation of closed-loop performance. The defender, on the
other hand, aims to prevent this loss. Both players trade their
control performance objectives for the cost of their actions.
A Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium (MSNE) of the game
represents the allocation of the players’ respective resources
for attacking or protecting the network nodes. We analyze the
dependence of a MSNE on the relative budgets of the players as
well as on the important network nodes that must be preserved
to achieve a desirable LQR performance. MSNE is computed
using nonlinear programming. Results are validated using the
New England power system model, and it is shown that reliable
defense is feasible unless the cost of attack is very low or much
smaller than the cost of protection per generator.
Index Terms—Cyber-Security Investment Game, Mixed
Strategy Nash Equilibrium, Resource Allocation
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical security of network control systems is a
critical challenge for the modern society. Recently there
has been a renewed surge of interest on this topic in the
control systems community where researchers are trying to
understand how cyber-physical attacks can jeopardize closed-
loop stability and performance of network control systems.
Several illustrative results, tutorials, and surveys on this topic
have been presented in recent papers such as [1]–[4]. Game
theory is a common tool for modeling and analyzing cyber-
security problems as it effectively captures the conflict of
goals between attackers and defenders. The attacker tries
to maximize the damage to the closed-loop system while
the defender tries to minimize it. For example, [5] studies
control under denial-of-service (DoS) attacks using a unified
game approach, and derive optimality criteria and algorithms
for attackers versus defenders using optimal control theory.
Similarly, in [6] a dynamic multi-player non-zero sum game
with asymmetric information and resource constraints is
developed to obtain equilibrium solution under DoS attacks.
The majority of these investigations, however, are focused
on data manipulation or DoS attacks; the topic of malicious
destruction of communication hardware (e.g. circuit boards,
This research is partly supported by the US National Science Foundation
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memory units, and communication ports), in contrast, has
received relatively little attention. In reality, hardware attacks
can cause much more serious and lasting degradation [7]
since a single hardware failure can disable communications
or cause persistent jamming for an extended period of time
and require extensive repairs, as opposed to intermittent data
interruptions associated with DoS or detectable data integrity
attacks [8].
A legitimate question, therefore, is how can network
operators invest money for securing the important assets
of their system against hardware attacks under a limited
budget? The same question applies to attackers in terms
of targeting the best set of hardware devices to maximize
damage under a limited budget. These types of investment
games for cyber-security are still open research questions.
Some preliminary results have been reported in [9]–[11].
In [9], a strategic one-shot investment game with perfect
information between an attacker and defender is proposed
for a multi-node network, where the loss in the network
graph is proportional to the number of nodes under successful
attack. A game-theoretic framework to compute optimal
and strategic security investments by multiple defenders is
introduced in [10] using inter-dependency graphs. Neither
of these two papers, however, consider any control-theoretic
objective. In [11] the gap between the individual and socially
optimal security investment is investigated for a network of
identical control systems. While a Linear Quadratic Gaussian
(LQG) control objective is used within each sub-system, the
security interdependency model among the sub-systems is
not directly related to the physical system model.
In this paper, we develop a strategic game between an
attacker and a defender in a network control system with
linear quadratic regulator (LQR) based state-feedback control
u(t) = −Kx(t). The need for feedback control in our
model guides the level of attack and security investment. We
consider hardware-level attacks that disable all communica-
tion associated with a subset of network nodes, including
links for self-feedback, and thereby induce sparsity in the
feedback gain matrix K. The actions of the players are
given by a set of possible sparsity patterns [12] in K. The
attacker invests her resources to promote these patterns in
such a way that the value of the closed-loop LQR objective
function increases sharply while the defender invests in
tamper-resistant devices [2], intrusion monitoring, devices
or software that ensure authorized and authenticated access
via increased surveillance [13], etc., in order to prevent
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such harmful sparsity patterns in K. A resulting Mixed
Strategy Nash Equilibrium (MSNE) describes the resource
allocation of the two players over a range of cost parameters,
reflecting their relative budgets. As the cost of defense per
node increases, MSNE reveals the identity of the important
physical nodes [14] that need to be protected. We validate
our results using the IEEE New England power system model
and determine the defender’s budget requirements to ensure
successful protection of closed-loop LQR performance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we present the system model. In Section III, we formulate
the proposed mixed-strategy investment game for network
control systems. Numerical results and performance evalua-
tion for the New England power grid model are provided in
Section IV. Section V concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a Network Control System (NCS) with n
nodes, where each node may contain multiple states and
control inputs, as shown in Fig. 1. The state vector xi ∈ Rmi
measured at the ith node, i = 1, . . . , n is communicated to
the node itself as well as to other nodes for taking control
actions. We refer to the self-communication links as local or
intra-node links, and to those between the nodes as inter-
node links. The state-space model of the network is written
as
x˙(t) = Ax(t) +Bu(t) +Dw(t), x(0) = x0. (1)
where x(t) = (xT1 (t), ...,x
T
n (t))
T ∈ Rm×1 is the vector of
states, xj ∈ Rmj×1 is the vector of states for node j ∈
{1, ..., n}, u(t) = (uT1 (t), ...,uTn (t))T ∈ Rr×1 is the vector
of control inputs, uj ∈ Rrj×1 is the vector of control inputs
of node j, w(t) is a scalar impulse disturbance, A ∈ Rm×m,
B ∈ Rm×r, D ∈ Rm×1 are the state matrix, input matrix,
and disturbance matrix, respectively. The physical topology
of the network is assumed to be reflected in A. The controller
u(t) is assumed to be a linear state-feedback control of the
form
u(t) = −Kx(t), (2)
where K ∈ Rr×m is the feedback gain matrix is given by
K =

K11 K12 · · · K1n
K21 K22 · · · K2n
...
... · · · ...
Kn1 Kn2 · · · Knn
 . (3)
Here, the block Kij represents the feedback gains from the
states of node j and the controller of node i. The control
objective is to minimize the quadratic function
J(K) =
∫ ∞
t=0
[x(t)TQx(t) + u(t)TRu(t)]dt, (4)
where Q = QT  0 ∈ Rm×m and R = RT  0 ∈ Rr×r
are given positive semi-definite and positive definite design
matrices, respectively.
Fig. 1: System topology
III. MIXED STRATEGY INVESTMENT GAME
We consider hardware-level attacks that aim to disable
or persistently jam the communication within and to/from
a subset of nodes of a NCS, thus preventing feedback of
states from and reception of control inputs into these nodes,
degrading the system-wide control performance. To model
the interaction between the attacker and a defender, we
employ a strategic, two-player, mixed-strategy (MS) [15]
investment game. In the proposed game, the attacker invests
into disabling the communication equipment while the de-
fender invests into protecting it. The players have opposite
control performance goals —the attacker aims to increase
the expected system-wide energy (4) while the defender tries
to keep it as low as possible. The player’s action sets and
the control performance objectives are outlined in Section
III.A. Moreover, the players aim to reduce their costs of
attack/protection, resulting in combined objectives (payoffs),
which include both the control performance metric and the
cost for each player’s action as detailed in Section III.B. In
the proposed game, the players choose from the subsets of
nodes to attack/protect according to their mixed strategies,
i.e., the probabilities assigned to each subset. The game
solution is given by a MSNE as detailed in Section III.C.
The outcome of the game is a stochastic investment strategy,
which jointly optimizes the cost/performance trade-offs for
both players. The overall objective is to determine the regions
of players’ relative budgets where cyber-security protection
is effective.
A. Player’s Actions and the Energy Loss
The action spaces of both players are given by the set X
of all possible binary N-tuples
X = {xm = (x1m, ..., xnm) | xpm ∈ {0, 1} ,
p = 1, ..., n, m = 0, ..., N − 1,
N = 2n} .
(5)
We refer to the N elements xm of X as sparsity patterns.
Possible actions of the attacker are the “attack” sparsity
patterns ai ∈ X , where aki = 0 implies the kth node is
attacked (i.e., the attacker attempts to disable all communica-
tion/feedback within and to/from node k), and aki = 1 means
the communication of node k remains intact. Similarly, the
actions of the defender are all “protection” patterns pj ∈ X ,
where pkj = 1 if the defender protects node k and 0 if the
node is unprotected. We assume that the communication for
the node that is both attacked and protected remains intact,
i.e. when node k is protected, the attack on this node is not
going to succeed. Note that the actual sparsity pattern of the
system-wide feedback matrix depends on the actions of both
players. Thus, we define the 2-dimensional N ×N array S
with elements given by vectors of length n:
si,j = ai ∨ pj , i, j = 0, ..., N − 1 (6)
where ∨ is a bit-wise binary OR operator, which for each
element k of si,j produces the output 0 only if both inputs
are 0, i.e. when the node k is attacked, but not protected. The
elements of si,j determine the structural sparsity constraint
[12] on the resulting system-wide feedback matrix K, with
the sub-blocks Kmn in (3) set to zero if sli,j = 0 for l = m
and/or l = n. For example, consider the 3-node network in
Fig. 1. The set X contains N = 8 elements
X = {000, 001, 010, 011, 100, 101, 110, 111} . (7)
Suppose the i = 2 action of the attacker corresponds to
disabling communication for nodes 1 and 3 (ai = (010))
and the j = 4 action of the defender is to protect only node
1 (pj = (100)). Thus si,j = (110), i.e. for this combination
of the attacker’s and the defender’s actions, communication is
disabled within and to/from node 3, resulting in the sparsity
constraint on the feedback matrix K, as illustrated in Fig. 2.
Note that other combinations of attack and defense actions
could also result in the sparsity pattern shown in the figure.
Fig. 2: Disabled communication for the sparsity pattern si,j =
(110) and the sparsity-constrained feedback matrix resulting from
attacking nodes 1 and 3 and defending node 1 only. All communi-
cation and local links associated with node 3 are removed.
Next, we define, the energy loss matrix ∆ with the
elements
∆si,j = J(K
∗
si,j )− J(K∗lqr), i, j = 0, ..., N − 1 (8)
where K∗lqr and K
∗
si,j optimize the LQR objective function
(4) without and with the structural sparsity constraint im-
posed by si,j , respectively. The second term in (8) indicates
the optimal LQR system performance (with unconstrained
Klqr matrix, which can have feedback within and among
all nodes). The first term is the smallest energy achieved
when the structural sparsity specified by the pattern si,j
is imposed on the feedback matrix, computed using the
structural sparsity optimization algorithm in [12]. The loss
(8) is the system-wide energy increase caused by the sparsity
constraint si,j (i.e the unprotected attacks in the pair ai,pj).
B. The Payoffs and Mixed Strategies
Given the attacker’s and defender’s actions ai and pj and
the corresponding sparsity pattern si,j (6), the N×N payoff
matrices Ua of the attacker and Ud of the defender have the
elements:
Uaij = ∆si,j − γa(nai),
Udij = −∆si,j − γd(npj ),
i, j = 0, ..., N − 1
(9)
where ∆si,j is the performance loss (8), nai is the number
of zero (attacked nodes) in the pattern ai, npj is the number
of ones (protected nodes) in pj , and γa, γd is the player’s
cost per attacked or defended node, respectively.
A mixed strategy of the attacker is given by a vector
r = (r0, r1, ..., rN−1),
N−1∑
i=0
ri = 1, (10)
where ri ≥ 0 is the probability the attacker chooses to take
action ai. Similarly, a mixed strategy of the defender is
d = (d0, d1, ..., dN−1),
N−1∑
j=0
dj = 1, (11)
where dj ≥ 0 is the probability that defender’s action is pj .
Finally, given the mixed strategies r and d, the expected
payoffs of the attacker and defender are given by
Ea(r,d) = rUadT = E(∆)− E(Ca),
Ed(r,d) = rUddT = −E(∆)− E(Cd),
(12)
where
E(∆) = r∆dT (13)
is the expected control performance loss, where ∆ is speci-
fied by (8), and
E(Ca) = γaE(nai), (14-a)
E(Cd) = γdE(npj ), (14-b)
are the expected costs of the attacker and the defender,
respectively. From (12), Ea(r∗,d∗) ≥ 0 and Ed(r∗,d∗) ≤
0.
The proposed MS game must be played many times to
realize the attacker and defender’s expected utilities, and it
is a one-shot game, i.e., the players do not have information
on how each player has acted in the past. In each game
realization, the attacker (or defender) aims to maximize its
individual payoff Ea(r,d) (or Ed(r,d)) by controlling its
mixed strategy r (or d), respectively [15]. To achieve their
optimal objectives, the players must balance the costs and
control performance terms in (13)-(14), and a higher γa
or γd value implies that the cost associated with attack or
protection, respectively, increases, thus forcing the player
to save money and, consequently, compromise its control
performance objective.
C. Computing MSNE
Since the action spaces of the players are finite (5), the
proposed game has at least one MSNE [15] (r∗,d∗) given
by
Ea(r
∗,d∗) = r∗Uad∗T ≥ rUad∗T = Ea(r,d∗) : ∀r
Ed(r
∗,d∗) = r∗Udd∗T ≥ r∗UddT = Ed(r∗,d) : ∀d
(15)
The MSNE (15) determines the probabilities the players
use to choose their strategies in the game implementation.
To compute a MSNE, we employ nonlinear programming
(NLP) as follows. The vector (r∗,d∗) is a MSNE if and
only if it satisfies, along with scalars f∗, g∗, the following
nonlinear program, [15], Theorem 3.4.1:
max
ri,di,f,g
N−1∑
i=0
N−1∑
j=0
riUaijdj +
N−1∑
i=0
N−1∑
j=0
riUdijdj − f − g
(16-a)
s.t.
N−1∑
j=0
Uaijdj ≤ f : ∀i = 0, 1, ..., N − 1 (16-b)
N−1∑
i=0
riUdij ≤ g : ∀j = 0, 1, ..., N − 1 (16-c)
ri ≥ 0, dj ≥ 0, (16-d)
N−1∑
i=0
ri = 1,
N−1∑
j=0
dj = 1. (16-e)
where f∗ = Ea(r∗,d∗) and g∗ = Ed(r∗,d∗). We solve (16)
using MATLAB solver fmincon.
In summary, a MSNE (r∗,d∗) computed by the NLP
algorithm in (16) determines the players’ optimal mixed
strategies and the expected utilities of the attacker and the de-
fender (12). These utilities balance the control performance
loss (8) and the players’ costs. Moreover, the optimization
(16) guides allocation of security resources by establishing
the regions where a desirable level of control performance
protection is possible for a given NCS.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. Power system model
We next show that the proposed MS game can be useful
for combating security threats on wide-area control (WAC)
loops of power system networks. We analyze the dependency
of the game solution on the costs of attack and defense,
and illustrate the regions of costs where reliable protection
is possible for a given WAC. This investigation reveals the
identity of the important generators for protection in cost-
constrained regions. The WAC problem is formulated as
follows.
Consider a power system network with n synchronous
generators. Each generator is modeled by its flux-decay
model, which is a common choice for designing wide-area
damping controllers using excitation control. The model for
the ith generator can be written as
δ˙i =ωi (17)
Miω˙i =Pmi − diωi − |Vi|Ei
x
′
di
sin(δi − ∠Vi)
+
|Vi|2
2
( 1
x
′
di
− 1
xqi
)
sin(2δi − 2∠Vi) (18)
τdoiE˙i =− xdi
x
′
di
Ei +
(xdi
x
′
di
− 1
)
|Vi| cos(δi − ∠Vi) + Vfdi,
(19)
followed by active and reactive power balance equations
Pi =
Ei|Vi|
x
′
di
sin(δi − ∠Vi) (20)
− |Vi|
2
2
( 1
x
′
di
− 1
xqi
)
sin(2δi − 2∠Vi)
Qi =
Ei|Vi|
x
′
di
cos(δi − ∠Vi) (21)
− |Vi|2
(
sin2(δi − ∠Vi)
xqi
− cos
2(δi − ∠Vi)
x
′
di
)
.
Equations (17)-(18) represent the electro-mechanical swing
dynamics, and (19) represents the electro-magnetic dynamics
of the ith generator. δi is the rotor phase angle, ωi is the rotor
speed, Ei is the internal voltage of the ith generator, while
Vi is the voltage phasor at the generator bus, Pi and Qi are
the active and reactive power outputs of the generator, and
Vfdi is the exciter voltage. Definitions of the various model
parameters are standard in the literature [16]. The generator
model is coupled with the model of an exciter consisting of
an automatic voltage regulator (AVR) and a power system
stabilizer (PSS) whose combined dynamics can be written as
τei V˙fdi =− Vfdi + V Ffdi +Kai(|Vi| − |Vi|F − νi + γi)
(22)
ζ˙i =Apssζi +Bpssωi, νi = Cpssζi +Dpssωi (23)
where superscript F means set-point. The signal γi serves as
a control input representing an additional voltage reference
signal to the AVR that can be designed to add damping to
the slow or inter-area oscillation modes using state feedback
from all generators spread across the grid. These controllers
are referred to as wide-area controllers (WAC).
Our control design does not necessarily need the gen-
erators to follow this simple model. Detailed models of
generators are allowed, provided all the generator states
can be measured or estimated (for details of decentralized
phasor-based state estimation please see [17]). In general,
we assume the ith generator to consist of mi states ξi =
[δi, ωi, xi,rem] ∈ Rmi where xi,rem is the vector of all non-
electromechanical states, and one scalar control input γi as in
(22), which is the field excitatin voltage, and
∑n
i=1mi = m
(total number of states). Let the pre-disturbance equilibrium
of the ith generator be ξ∗i = [δ
∗
i , ω
∗
i , x
∗
i,rem]. The
differential-algebraic model of the generators and the power
flow is converted to a state-space model using Kron reduction
[16], and linearized about ξ∗i , i = 1, 2, ..., n. The small-
signal model of the system with the ith state defined as
xi = ξi − ξ∗i , can then be written as (1). Note that the state
vector xi includes the AVR and PSS states from (22)-(23)
linearized around their respective equilibria. The small-signal
control input is given by ui = ∆γi, and the disturbance w
in (1) is modeled as an impulse input entering through the
acceleration equation of the generator.
We model the attacks where the wide-area communication
to/from and within a generator (node) is disabled when
a hardware attack occurs, keeping the PSS intact for all
generators. The matrix R is chosen as the identity matrix,
while Q is chosen such that all the generators arrive at
a consensus in their small-signal changes in phase angle
and frequencies, as dictated by the physical topology of the
network [18]. The objective function is chosen as
Estates = ∆δ
T L¯∆δ + ∆ωT L¯∆ω + ∆xTremL¯∆xrem (24)
where L¯ is constructed as
L¯ = mI− 1m.1Tm (25)
where m is the total number of states. Physically, this means
that the first two terms in the objective function (24) are in
the consensus form
∆δT L¯∆δ =
m∑
i=1
m∑
j>i
(∆δi −∆δj)2.
∆ωT L¯∆ω =
m∑
i=1
m∑
j>i
(∆ωi −∆ωj)2.
(26)
Then (26) can be expressed as
Estates =

∆δ
∆ω
∆xrem

T 
L¯
L¯
I

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q

∆δ
∆ω
∆xrem
 (27)
= xT (Q)x.
B. Game results for the New England Power System
Next, we employ the WAC characterization (17-27) to
investigate the proposed game for the IEEE 39-bus New
England power system model. The model consists of 10
synchronous generators spread among 39 buses. Generator
1 is modeled by 7 states, generators 2 to 9 are modeled by
8 states each, and generator 10 by 4 states.
Disabled
generator
subset
Fract. loss %
(local links
disabled)
Fract. loss %
(local links
intact)
2 4.91 0.03
4 5.32 0.06
6 5.01 0.05
8 2.57 0.02
1,7,8 10.23 0.10
9 6.37 0.09
2,4,6,9 34.31 0.23
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 2.9× 105
(open-loop)
0.5
TABLE I: Disabled generator subsets for sparsity patterns si,j (6)
with dominant fractional losses
∆si,j
J(K∗
lqr
)
(%)
Table 1 illustrates the fractional control performance losses
given by ∆si,j (%) (see (8)) for the sparsity patterns S
(6) with J(K∗lqr). Note that when generators 9, 4, 6, 2 are
disabled jointly, high loss occurs. However attacking or
protecting this set also incurs high cost for the players. Note
that for patterns where only single unprotected generator is
attacked, the highest loss is observed for the disabled gener-
ator 9, followed by generators 4, 6, 2, 3, 1, 5, 7, 8, imposing
the importance order of the nodes.
From Table 1, we observe that when only the inter-node
communication links are disabled while the self-links are
intact (see Fig. 1), the losses are greatly reduced, confirming
that the self-links are critical to the system’s control perfor-
mance. The inter-node communication links can be compro-
mised using cyber-attacks in the communication medium.
They are less expensive than node attacks investigated in
this paper, which require hardware manipulation, but also
affect the self-links and thus lead to much stronger damage
as shown in Table 1. Note that when WAC communication
between and within all generators is disabled, extremely large
loss results since the system is in open-loop operation (see
last entry of Table 1). On the other hand, when self-links
are intact, but the generators cannot communicate with each
other, the loss is relatively low. Note that the papers on
structural sparsity [12], sparsity promotion [14] and sparsity-
constrained [18] algorithms did not include examples where
the self-links were disabled. However, the algorithms in these
papers can be extended to the latter case. For example, when
in the sparsity-promotion Alternating Direction Method of
Multipliers (ADMM) method in [14], the parameter γ is
increased beyond the range studied in that paper, the self-
links are removed in the order that corresponds to the order
of the losses illustrated in Table 1, thus confirming the
decreasing order of importance of generators 9, 4, 6, 2, as
well as the significance of self-links shown in Table 1. In the
rest of the paper, we assume that when unprotected nodes
are attacked, the self-links are disabled, thus reflecting the
losses associated with hardware-level attacks.
In Fig. 3(a)-(b), we illustrate the expected payoffs of
the players (12), the expected fractional loss, and the ex-
pected fractional costs E(Ca)J(K∗lqr) (%), and
E(Cd)
J(K∗lqr)
(%) (14),
at MSNE (15) vs. γd when γa = 0.01. Moreover, the
attacked/protected node subsets with dominant probabilities
at MSNE are shown in Fig. 3(c) for some γd values. Note
that as γd increases, the number of protected nodes decreases,
thus reducing and increasing the payoffs of the defender and
the attacker, respectively. The expected control performance
loss (13) also grows as defense investment decreases for
higher values of γd since attacks become more successful.
Note that the expected cost of the defender (14-b) also grows
with γd, demonstrating the control performance/cost trade-
off. On the other hand, the expected cost of the attacker (14-
a) saturates at a low value (14.19 %). Since γa is small, the
attacker can afford to attack all nodes with high probability
as shown in Fig. 3(c). However, as γa grows, the attacker’s
ability to cause significant damage quickly reduces as will
be illustrated below.
In Fig. 3(c), when γd = 0, a pure-strategy NE occurs since
the defender protects all nodes, and the attacker saves money
(a)
(b)
(c)
Fig. 3: Performance at MSNE vs. γd; γa = 0.01; (a) Expected pay-
offs of the players (12); (b) Fractional expected energy loss E(∆)
J(K∗
lqr
)
and costs E(Ca)
J(K∗
lqr
)
and E(Cd)
J(K∗
lqr
)
(%); (c) Attacked/protected subsets
of nodes with two highest probabilities (all other probabilities are
below 0.03) and expected fractional loss E(∆)
J(K∗
lqr
)
(%)
by not acting at all. Note that other (mixed) NEs are also
possible, but the payoff is zero for both players for all these
NEs, implying that the control performance is preserved.
As γd increases, the defender invests in the more important
subsets of nodes while the attacker invests mostly into
attacking all nodes due to low γa value. The transitions in
the curves in Fig. 3(a)-(b) correspond to the reduction in the
numbers of protected nodes as γd grows, which is illustrated
by node subsets in Fig. 3(c). As γd approaches 0.3, the
defender mostly protects the important nodes 9 and 4, and for
0.5 ≤ γd < 1840, the most important generator 9 is protected
with very high probability due to high cost of defense per
node. The corresponding control performance loss grows as
(a)
(b)
Fig. 4: Performance at MSNE vs. γa; γd = 0.1; (a) Expected
payoffs of the players (12); (b) Attacked/protected subsets of nodes
with highest probabilities (all other probabilities are below 0.03)
and the attacker’s expected utility Ea(r∗,d∗)
γd increases. Finally, for very high γd ≥ 1840, we obtain a
pure NE where the defender chooses not to protect any nodes
and, since γa is very low, the attacker successfully disables
all communication in the system, resulting in the open-loop
operation, which has the total loss of 1840 or the fractional
loss 2.9× 105%.
In Fig. 4, we illustrate the expected payoffs of the play-
ers at MSNE vs. γa for γd = 0.1. Fig. 4(b) shows the
attacked/protected node subsets with the dominant proba-
bilities at MSNE for some values of γa. We observe that
the defender protects the important nodes while the attacker
starts allocating resources to the unprotected nodes as γa
increases. Note that for γa ≥ 0.03, the attacker’s payoff is
zero. Thus, it is not advantageous for the attacker to act in
this region, resulting in successful system protection.
Fig. 5 illustrates the dependency of the expected payoffs
of the players on the costs γa and γd, with values in the
interval (0, 0.1). First, we consider the special case when
γa = γd = 0 in (9), i.e., the costs are negligible, or both
players have unlimited resources. On solving the zero-sum
game, we obtain a pure NE with all nodes attacked and
protected with probability 1, respectively, which results in
zero expected payoffs of both players and thus effective
system protection, as shown by point Z1. As γd increases, the
defender’s payoff diminishes, consistent with Fig. 3 results.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 5: Game performance at MSNE vs. γa and γd; The expected
players’ payoffs (12); (a) Attacker; (b) Defender
We also observe that unless γa is very small (much smaller
than the expected loss) or γd >> γa, the attacker’s payoff
at MSNE (15) is Ea(r∗,d∗) = 0. Since the attacker can
obtain this payoff by not acting, it loses its incentive to attack
the system, resulting in successful protection for most of the
region shown in Fig. 5. (Note that the game can have multiple
MSNEs (15) [15], but a MSNE where the attacker does not
act with probability 1 is guaranteed to exist for all (γa, γd)
points where Ea(r∗,d∗) = 0 in Fig. 4 and 5).
Finally, the routine for finding a MSNE for a given
set of (γa, γd) values runs in under 900 seconds1. The
computational load of the structural sparsity optimization
[12] for each sparsity pattern si,j (6) dominates the overall
runtime of the game implementation, but this computation
can be shared for all (γa, γd) points. We can limit the total
time of the latter optimization by limiting the action space (5)
to sets of important nodes (which can be found using [14]
or [18]). The NLP algorithm (16) is also computationally
intensive due to the large size of the system matrices. Since
the proposed game solves a resource-planning problem and
is implemented offline, the computation complexity does not
significantly impact its implementation.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We developed a mixed-strategy investment game between
an attacker and a defender of a network control system.
1The experiments are run using MATLAB on Windows 10 with 64-bit
operating system, 3.4 GHz Intel core i7 processor, and 8GB memory
The proposed game allows to allocate the players’ resources
strategically to save costs and optimize their control per-
formance objectives. We found that the defender can suc-
cessfully protect the network from hardware-level attacks
that disable communication and thus compromise the control
performance unless the cost of attack is very low or is
significantly exceeded by the cost of protection per system
node. Moreover, as the cost of defense per node increases,
a MSNE of the game reveals the important nodes that must
be protected to avoid large control performance loss. Future
research will address practical game implementation under
limited system knowledge by the players.
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